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FACES OF OPEN COURTS AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Steven D. Schwinn t 
Most state bills of rights are longer than the first ten 
Amendments, containing rights and guarantees not found in 
the Federal Constitution. The most widespread and 
important of these unique state provisions is probably the 
guarantee of a ri¥ht of access to the courts to obtain a 
remedy for injury. 
"It has long been recognized that equal access to the courts, and 
modes of procedure therein, constitute basic and fundamental rights. 
The courts must be open to all on the same terms without prejudice.,,2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The quest to establish a civil right to counsel, or "Civil Gideon,,,3 is 
largely defined in relation to Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services. 4 In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that an 
indigent parent subject to a state-initiated termination-of-parental-
rights proceeding was not entitled to court-appointed counsel under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The Lassiter 
Court ruled that other, future indigent civil litigants may be entitled to 
court-appointed counsel, but only if they can show that the balance of 
the familiar three-part procedural due process test in Mathews v. 
t Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to 
thank the members of the University of Baltimore Law Review for hosting this 
important symposium on the civil right to counsel, "Civil Gideon," and for their 
outstanding editorial work on this piece. All errors, of course, are my own. The 
author also wishes to thank symposium keynote presenter Stephen H. Sachs and co-
panelists Debra Gardner and John Ebbott for a stimulating discussion that contributed 
to the development of this article. 
1. Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 
1310 (2003). 
2. Thayerv. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Okla. 1980). 
3. "Civil Gideon" refers to the categorical constitutional right to appointed counsel in a 
civil case, comparable to that same right in a criminal trial under Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
4. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
5. ld.at31,33. 
21 
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Eldridge6 outweighs the newfangled, Court-created "presumption" 
against appointment of counsel, except in cases where physical 
liberty is at stake. 7 
The upshot of Lassiter is that Civil Gideon instigators must show, 
on a case-by-case basis, some combination of a very important 
personal interest at stake in the litigation, a very unimportant 
governmental interest at stake (or a governmental interest that aligns 
with the personal interest, as in the best interest of the child in a 
custody proceeding), and a very high likelihood of an erroneous 
decision if the court fails to appoint counsel. 8 Even then, an indigent 
litigant must show that the balance of these Mathews factors 
outweighs the Lassiter "presumption" against counsel, except in 
cases where physical liberty is at stake.9 Only then will an indigent 
litigant succeed in gaining court-appointed counsel under Fourteenth 
Amendment procedural due process. 10 
Against this backdrop', Civil Gideon litigation strategies fall into 
two camps. The first includes litigation that attempts to work 
through Lassiter. In these cases, indigent litigants attempt to show 
that the Mathews factors in their case overcome the Lassiter 
"presumption." II Thus litigants attempt to show that their personal 
interest in parenthood, housing, or personal safety, among others, is 
very high-as close as possible to the privileged interest in physical 
liberty. Next, they try to show that the governmental interest is 
merely financial, or that it aligns with their personal interest. 12 And 
finally, they attempt to show that the complexity of their case is such 
that mistakes will be made if they lack legal representation. 13 
6. 424 u.s. 319,334-35 (1976). 
7. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 ("If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their 
strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at 
their peak, it could not be said that the [Mathews] factors did not overcome the 
presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and that due process did not 
therefore require the appointment of counsel. "). 
8. See id. at 37. 
9. See id. at 27. 
10. Professor Bruce Boyer aptly describes Lassiter as a "scourge" for this and other 
reasons. Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free 
Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Services of Durham, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 635, 636 (2005). 
11. See infra note 14. 
12. Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in 
Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 557, 588 (2006). 
13. See, e.g., id. at 557 (arguing that plaintiffs in domestic violence cases satisfy the 
Lassiter test). The American Bar Association has taken a position similar to this 
approach. The ABA House of Delegates adopted a policy resolution on access to 
civil justice that calls for "legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low 
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This camp has seen some success,14 but it has two shortcomings. 
First, this camp will never achieve a categorical constitutional right to 
court-appointed counsel in civil cases-a true Civil Gideon-unless 
the United States Supreme Court overrules Lassiter. 15 Lassiter has 
established a case-by-case approach, and any victories are therefore 
necessarily limited to that case. The civil doctrinal landscape under 
Lassiter is thus precisely the same as the criminal landscape before 
Gideon v. Wainwright. 16 Under Betts v. Brady,17 Gideon's precursor, 
indigent criminal defendants had to show on a case-by-case basis that 
income persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human 
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child 
custody, as determined by each jurisdiction." American Bar Association Task Force 
on Access to Civil Justice, ABA Resolution on Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & 
C1v. RTS. L. REV. 507, 508 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/ 
sclaididownloads/06AI12A.pdf[hereinafter ABA Task Force] (emphasis added). 
14. See, e.g., Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1449-50 (lOth Cir. 1996) (holding that 
petitioner had a due process right to counsel in a deprivation-of-parental-rights 
proceeding); Kenny A. ex rei. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353,1357 (N.D. Ga. 
2005) (holding that children have a due process right to counsel in deprivation and 
termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, based upon their interests at stake); 
S.C.D. v. Etowah County Dep't of Human Res., 841 So. 2d 277, 279 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2002) (finding that due process entitled parents to the right of counsel in a permanent 
child deprivation proceeding); In re O.S., 102 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1407 (2002) 
(finding that a parent has a constitutional right to counsel); In re Powers, 624 N.W.2d 
472,477-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a parent in a termination proceeding 
has the right to counsel); In re Welfare of Luscier, 524 P.2d 906, 908 (Wash. 1974) 
(holding that appointment of counsel was constitutionally required in permanent 
deprivation proceedings for indigent parents); Marathon County Dep't of Soc. Servs. 
v. LH., 476 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (finding the parent was entitled to 
counsel under the due process clause of the federal constitution). But see, e.g., In re 
Travarius 0., 799 N.E.2d 510, 517 (III. App. Ct. 2003) (finding that petitioner had no 
right to new counsel on a fourth occasion); In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 
1071, 1079 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that petitioner had no due process right to 
counsel in a termination proceeding, but the same petitioner had an equal protection 
right to counsel because similarly situated individuals under a different statutory 
scheme had a statutory right to counsel); K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds County Dep't of 
Human Servs., 771 So.2d 907, 911 (Miss. 2000) (holding that petitioner had no due 
process right to counsel in a termination proceeding). 
15. But c.f Balos, supra note II, at 591-96 (2006) (arguing that domestic violence cases 
categorically satisfy the Lassiter test); Erik Pitchal, Children's Constitutional Right 
to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & C1v. RTS. L. REv. 663, 670-82 
(2006) (tracing the litigation that established the right to counsel for children in 
dependency cases under Georgia's Due Process Clause and arguing that this 
litigation stands for the proposition, following from an analysis of the Mathews 
factors, that these children have a procedural due process right to counsel). 
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
17. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 335. 
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they were entitled to court-appointed counsel,18 and any victory was 
therefore purely personal, limited to each defendant's case. Gideon 
overruled Betts and held that indigent defendants subject to 
incarceration in state criminal prosecutions have a categorical due 
process right to counsel. 19 
The other problem with this strategy is that litigants must always 
deal in personal interests. Litigants must try to elevate or equate their 
personal interests in their cases with the privileged interest in 
physical liberty in order to overcome the "presumption" in Lassiter. 20 
Because no personal interest has ever equated with physical liberty in 
the Court's procedural due process jurisprudence,21 this is a very 
difficult task to say the least. It is also risky. In making the claim, 
Civil Gideon instigators risk a decision that situates the pertinent 
personal interest significantly lower on the hierarchy than they 
wished. This may set them back in other, unexpected ways, such as 
claiming that the same interest is "fundamental" in a future, unrelated 
case. 
The second camp attempts to avoid these shortcomings by working 
around Lassiter. This set of strategies seeks to dodge the first camp's 
inevitable focus on personal interests by looking to alternative 
constitutional arguments to establish Civil Gideon. Litigants have 
thus turned to state constitutional arguments based on state due 
process clauses that reject Lassiter's approach22 and state equal 
18. Id. at 471-72 ("[W]e are unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated 
in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the states, whatever may be their own views, 
to furnish counsel in every [criminal case]. Every court has power, if it deems 
proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of 
fairness. "). 
19. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339. 
20. Professor Douglas Besharov poignantly illustrated one problem with Lassiter's focus 
on interests and its priority of physical liberty: "Lassiter, for all practical purposes, 
stands for the proposition that a drunken driver's night in the cooler is a greater 
deprivation ofliberty than a parent's permanent loss of rights in a child." Douglas J. 
Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to Counsel 
After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981). 
21. See ABA Task Force, supra note 13, at 513 (discussing the "additional presumption 
against appointed counsel where there is no risk of loss of physical liberty[,]" and 
stating that "[i]t is to be hoped that the U.S. Supreme Court will eventually 
reconsider the cumbersome Lassiter balancing test and the unreasonable presumption 
that renders that test irrelevant for almost all civil litigants."); Phillips, supra note I, 
at 1318 n.34 (stating that the Supreme Court has not yet incorporated a remedy 
guarantee into the Due Process Clause). 
22. For examples of state courts' rejections of Lassiter under their respective state 
constitutions, see K.P.B. v. D.C.A. (In re J.L.B.), 685 So. 2d 750, 752 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1996) (rejecting Lassiter under the state constitution, and holding that an indigent 
2007) Civil Right to Counsel 25 
protection clauses that ignore Lassiter's approach altogether. 23 Other 
arguments in this camp seek to move toward a full Civil Gideon 
indirectly, via an intermediate doctrinal step,24 or through judicial 
strategies other than litigation. 25 
parent had a state constitutional right to counsel in a tennination proceeding); In re 
K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 278, 282 (Alaska 1991) (rejecting Lassiter under the state 
constitution, and holding that a parent had a state constitutional right to counsel in a 
tennination proceeding); In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 260-62 (1983) (rejecting 
Lassiter under the state constitution, and holding that an indigent parent had a state 
constitutional right to counsel in a tennination proceeding); In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 
129-30 (1993) (holding that a parent had a state constitutional due process right to 
appointed counsel in a proceeding to tenninate parental rights); see also Michael 
Millemann, The State Due Process Justification Jor a Right to Counsel in Some Civil 
Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & ClY. RTS. L. REV. 733, 746-57 (2006) (arguing that state due 
process clauses provide a path to Civil Gideon in certain cases). 
23. See, e.g., In re Adoption of K.L.P., 735 N.E.2d 1071, 1078-80 (III. App. Ct. 2000) 
(holding that a litigant under the state Adoption Act, which did not provide for 
appointed counsel, had a state constitutional equal protection right to counsel, where a 
similarly situated litigant under the Juvenile Court Act would have had a statutory right 
to counsel), ajJ'd, 763 N.E.2d 741 (III. 2002); In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 
558, 561, 566 (N.D. 1993) (holding that a litigant under the state Adoption Act, in 
which the right to counsel was uncertain, had a state constitutional equal protection 
right to counsel, where a similarly situated litigant under the Juvenile Court Act or the 
Parentage Act had a certain statutory right to counsel). But see, e.g., In re Curtis S., 25 
Cal. App. 4th 687, 692-93 (1994) (holding that an appellant who appealed a 
tennination order in a private action had no equal protection right to counsel, even 
though a similarly situated appellant in a state-initiated tennination case would have a 
statutory right to counsel), abrogated by In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363, 371-72 (Cal. 2002) 
(holding that an appellant who appealed a tennination order in a private action had no 
statutory right to counsel, but declining to address the argument that failure to appoint 
counsel in this situation violated the appellant's constitutional right to equal protection 
of the law). 
24. JOHN F. EBBOTT, KEVIN G. MAGEE & JACK W. EBBOTT, TOWARD A CIVIL GRIFFIN IN 
WISCONSIN: EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION 67-71 (2005) 
[hereinafter TOWARD A CIVIL GRIFFIN] (arguing for Civil Gideon via the equal justice 
principle in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), which held that when a criminal 
defendant has a state-created right to appeal, the state may not deny this appeal solely 
because the defendant is unable to afford a trial transcript). The equal justice 
principle means "if the state makes a court-access remedy available, it cannot deny 
that remedy to indigents solely because of their lack of means." Id. at 69. See also 
Steven D. Schwinn, The Right to Counsel on Appeal: Civil Douglas, 15 TEMP. POL. 
& CIv. RTS. L. REv. 603 (2005) (arguing for a constitutional civil right to counsel on 
appeal as a step toward achieving Civil Gideon); Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a 
"Civil Gideon" Under the Montana Constitution: Parental Rights as the Starting 
Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81, 83 (2005) (arguing for Civil Gideon based on Montana's 
open courts provision). 
25. See, e.g., Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon Jrom the Dynamics 
oj Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 697, 703-05 (2005) (arguing 
26 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 37 
This article explores another state constitutional strategy within this 
second camr: Civil Gideon under state constitutional "open courts" 
provisions. 2 In essence, open courts provisions guarantee that state 
courts will remain "open," that anyone harmed will have access to the 
courts to seek a remedy for the harm, and that courts shall dispense 
justice freely, fully, and speedily. 27 Maryland's open courts 
provision, one of the earliest, is typical: 
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person 
or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law 
of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely 
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without 
delay, according to the Law of the land. 28 
Forty state constitutions contain an express open courts provision. 29 
There are 32 different versions of the text,30 but they fall into two 
broad categories. 31 The first is represented by Maryland's provision, 
quoted above. The second version is represented by Justice Phillips's 
composite "[t]hat all courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done him in his person, ~roperty or reputation, shall have 
remedy by the due course of law." 2 
for a civil right to counsel by appealing to the administrative and bureaucratic 
interests of the judiciary and its personnel). 
26. See, e.g., Deborah Periuss, Washington's Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil 
Cases: Access to Justice v. Fundamental Interest, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 571, 
573-74 (2004) (arguing for Civil Gideon based on Washington's open courts 
provision). 
27. See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES §§ 6-2 to 6-6 (4th ed. 2006). 
28. MD. CONST. art. XIX. 
29. Phillips, supra note 1, at 1310; Paul Marvy & Debra Gardner, A Civil Right to 
Counsel for the Poor, 32 HUM. RTS., Summer 2005, at 8, 9 ("At least forty states 
have similar open courts provisions."). 
30. Professor Jennifer Friesen has counted 27 state constitutions 
that require courts to be open, 36 that require justice to be 
administered promptly, 27 that require justice to be administered 
without purchase or sale, 34 that require justice to be granted 
completely and/or without denial, and II that require justice to be 
delivered freely. Additionally, 35 states provide a right to a 
remedy, of which 21 require the remedy to be by due process or 
due course oflaw. 
Phillips, supra note 1, at 1310 n.7 (citing 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES app. 
6 §§ 6-65 to 6-67 (3d ed. 2000)) (citations omitted). 
31. Id. at 1310-11. 
32. /d. at 1311. 
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These clauses all derive from the open courts provisions in Magna 
Carta,33 and many later-entering states adopted their open courts 
provision directly from the open courts provisions in earlier state 
constitutions. 34 There is little recorded history of the adoption of 
these provisions, however. 35 And in the case of later-entering states, 
there is often no history-just the text, copied verbatim from the 
constitution of an earlier-entering state. 36 Thus, courts are left with 
the bare text of these provisions and their historical roots in Magna 
Carta in applying them. 
And in applying open courts clauses, court rulings have been nearly 
incomprehensible. Justice Phillips described the state of open courts 
jurisprudence as follows: 
These disparate results [among the courts' applications of 
open courts provisions] are essentially inexplicable. They 
cannot be harmonized by reliance on textual distinctions 
among the states. There is no correlation between the words 
of a particular guarantee and how expansively the courts of 
that state have applied it. Nor can these different outcomes 
be explained by historical, social, political, or cultural 
variations among the states. . .. [S]ome state courts defer 
unhesitatingly to legislative choices, while others routinely 
strike down any statutes that impede access to the courts or 
impair recovery under traditional theories. Finally, these 
distinctions cannot be explained by divergent intentions 
among the particular framers and ratifiers of the individual 
state constitutions. In most states, there is almost no 
historical record to explain what the framers and ratifiers 
thought the provision would accomplish. 37 
33. See infra notes 51-86 and accompanying text. 
34. Phillips, supra note 1, at 1315, 1323-24. 
35. Id. at 1315. 
36. See, e.g., Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 346 (Or. 2001) 
(describing how Oregon's open courts provision was based on Indiana's earlier open 
courts provision, which itself was based on yet earlier open courts provisions from 
Ohio and Kentucky). 
37. Phillips, supra note 1, at 1314-15; see, e.g., Daniel W. Halston, The Meaning of the 
Massachusetts 'Open Courts' Clause and its Relevance to the Current Court Crisis, 
88 MASS. L. REV. 122 (2004); Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The 
Ongoing Search to Understand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1005 (2001); Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of 
the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REv. 1279 (1995); David 
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1197 (1992). 
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Notwithstanding the courts' incoherence in applying open courts 
provisions to specific cases, some broad themes emerge from the 
jurisprudence, which may be helpful in moving toward Civil Gideon 
under open courts provisions. 38 
For convenience in outlining these themes, I have divided open 
courts provisions into two components: the "right to a remedy" and 
the "access to justice." 
The right-to-remedy component by its plain terms guarantees a 
remedy in law for every wrong or harm. 39 Litigants use this 
component to challenge restrictions on remedies, such as statutory 
caps on remedies, immunities of parties or potential parties, and 
statutes of limitations. 40 Two themes seem to emerge from these 
cases. First, courts that consider open courts challenges to absolute 
deprivations of causes of action look to the history of open courts 
provisions, including their roots in Magna Carta, to determine 
whether a restriction violates rights that were in existence when the 
particular state's open courts provision was adopted and, if sOf 
whether the legislature has provided a meaningful alternative. 4 
Second, courts that consider open courts challenges to partial 
deprivations of causes of action (such as damage caps or procedural 
prerequisites) use a highly deferential means-ends test. 42 
In contrast to the right-to-remedy component, the access-to-justice 
component of open courts guarantees "open" courts and free, full, 
and speedy justice. Litigants use this component to challenge 
technical impediments to court access, such as filing fees and 
attorney's fees. 43 Two themes also emerge from these cases. First, 
courts that consider fee barriers or judicial restraints on access 
usually adopt some form of a means-ends test and seem to privilege 
38. Phillips, supra note I, at 1343-45. 
39. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
40. Phillips, supra note I, at 1311-12. See also Strahler v. St. Luke's Hosp., 706 S.W.2d 
7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986) (finding statutory limitation period unconstitutional, as applied 
to minors); Oien v. City of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D. 1986) 
(finding statutes granting sovereign immunity for municipalities in construction, 
maintenance, and operation of parks unconstitutional); Lucas v. United States, 757 
S.W.2d 687, 688-89, 691 (Tex. 1988) (invalidating statutory cap on medical 
malpractice damages). 
41. See Smothers, 23 P.3d at 357-62. 
42. See, e.g., Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 905-06 (Mo. 1992) 
(finding statutes that placed cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice action did 
not violate open courts provision of state constitution). 
43. Phillips, supra note I, at 1312. See also Crocker v. Finley, 459 N.E.2d 1346, 1351 
(Ill. 1984) (holding that imposing fee in excess of court filing fee is unconstitutional). 
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an interest in judicial efficiency. 44 Second, courts that consider fee-
shifting or attorney's fee statutes use a varying means-ends test 
depending on the nature of the statute.45 The test privileges an 
interest in equal access in those cases involving an asymmetrical fee-
shifting statute. 46 
These trends--or the "faces" of open courts-are fodder for 
arguments in favor of Civil Gideon. More particularly, some 
combination of an historical argument (based on those right-to-
remedy cases involving a complete deprivation of a cause of action), 
an equal access argument (based on those access-to-justice cases 
involving attorney's fees), and a judicial efficiency argument (based 
on those access-to-justice cases involving fee barriers and judicial 
restraints on court access) provides a comprehensive open courts 
argument for Civil Gideon. 
This article first traces the history of open courts clauses.47 Next, it 
reviews the trends described above, looking at the trends in the right-
to-remedy cases48 and then in the access-to-justice cases.49 Finally, it 
provides some thoughts on arguments based on these trends that 
move toward an open courts Civil Gideon. 5o 
One important cautionary note: because open courts jurisprudence 
across states (and even within individual states) is sometimes 
unintelligible and incoherent, it is difficult to make any 
generalizations about it. This article certainly makes no claim to 
finding a grand theory of open courts rulings that reconcile them 
across jurisdictions. Nor does the article claim to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of open courts jurisprudence in any single 
jurisdiction, or across all states. Instead, this article merely attempts 
to sketch what appear to be some very broad trends in the open courts 
jurisprudence with the hope that instigators might build upon and use 
some of this analysis in their own work toward Civil Gideon. 
44. See, e.g., Crocker, 459 N.E.2d at 1352; Zamarron v. Pucinski, 668 N.E.2d 186, 190-
91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
45. See, e.g., Florida Patient's Compo Fund V. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1149 (Fla. 1985) 
(upholding post-litigation claims for attorney's fees because they encourage, rather 
than deter, the pursuit of medical malpractice claims). 
46. See, e.g., Thayer V. Phillips Petroleum Co., 613 P.2d 1041, 1043-45 (Okla. 1980) 
(the intent of an Oklahoma "statute imposing attorney fees on the defendant if the 
plaintiff prevails is to preserve the ... accessibility of the ... court"). 
47. See infra Part II. 
48. See infra Part lILA. 
49. See infra Part III.B. 
50. See infra Part IV. 
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II. HISTORY 
The state constitutional rights to a remedy and to open courts 
originated with Magna Carta in June 1215, when King John agreed to 
meet with rebellious barons at Runnymede to address their 
grievances related to the Kin~'s abuse of power and infringement 
upon their feudal jurisdiction. I In order to win back the barons' 
loyalty, King John agreed to Magna Carta. 52 
Magna Carta simply delineated the fundamental rights of 
landowners of the time. It did not set down new rights; instead, it 
defined existing rights, under the common law and ancient practices, 
which had previously only been vaguely understood. 53 Thus, Magna 
Carta merely restored the customary constraints on the King's 
authority. 54 
One of the barons' complaints involved King John's abuse of the 
judicial process, including, among other abuses, the practice of 
selling writs-the ticket for admission to the royal courts-at 
inconstant prices in accordance with the value of the underlying 
5l. A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 7, 220 (1968) [hereinafter THE ROAD FROM 
RUNNYMEDE]' Many outstanding sources trace this history of Magna Carta. See, 
e.g., id. at 10-13 (tracing the influence of Magna Carta in AnglO-American political 
thought and its restatement in U.S. federal and state constitutions); A.E. DICK 
HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 3-8 (1964) [hereinafter TEXT 
AND COMMENTARY] (providing a broad overview of the origins of Magna Carta, 
outlining its seminal provisions and charting its ultimate incorporation into American 
jurisprudence); WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON 
THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN vii-viii, 48-122 (2d ed. 1914) (analyzing the 
sixty-three chapters of Magna Carta in the context of the legal, political, economic, 
and social life in thirteenth-century Great Britain); FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: 
ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 1300-1629, at 3-6 (1948) 
(tracing the evolution of Magna Carta from the close of the reign of Edward I to the 
death of Sir Edward Coke). This section draws substantially from two other 
excellent histories and the respective sources cited therein. William C. Koch, Jr., 
Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article 
I. Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 333, 364-66 (1997); 
Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 341-42 (Or. 2001). 
52. TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 51, at 8, 34-36. 
53. See EDWARD COKE, A Proeme to the Second Part of the Institutes, in THE SECOND 
PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797). 
The 1225 version of Magna Carta "was for the most part declaratory of the principall 
grounds of the fundamentall laws of England, and for the residue it is additionall to 
supply some defects of the Common Law; and it was no new declaration: for King 
John in the 17 yeare of his raigne had granted the like, which also was called Magna 
Charta, as appeareth by a Record before this Great Charter made by the King H.3." 
Id. (alteration of original). 
54. THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 7. 
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claim or the wealth of the person seeking the writ. 55 For King John, 
writs were a source of revenue;56 for would-be litigants, they 
represented an illegitimate exercise of royal authority and a potential 
barrier to the courts. 
Chapters 39 and 40 of Magna Carta addressed the King's abuses of 
judicial power. 57 Chapter 39 read: "No freeman shall be taken or 
[and] imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor 
will we go upon him nor send upon him, except bl the lawful 
judgment of his peers or [and] by the law of the land.,,5 Chapter 40 
specifically addressed the abuses in the writ system; it read: "To no 
one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.,,59 
A mere nine weeks after Magna Carta became law, King John 
persuaded Pope Innocent II to annul it. 60 It reemerged under King 
Henry III in 1216 and again in 1217 and 1224, each time with 
significant revisions. 61 But Chapters 39 and 40 remained 
substantially intact, even if merged into a new Chapter 29: 
No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised 
of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, 
or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass 
upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his 
peers, or by the law of the land. We will sell to no mani we 
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right. 6
This provision gained its relevance for U.S. constitutional law in 
Sir Edward Coke's interpretation in his treatise, The Second Part of 
the Institutes of the Laws of England (the "Second Institute,,)63 first 
published in 1641, seven years after Coke's death. 64 Relying on 
historical records, Coke's Second Institute traced the history of 
Magna Carta since 1225 and explained its contemporary meaning-
not the meaning in 1225.65 He wrote this about Chapter 29: 
55. MCKECHNIE, supra note 51, at 89, 395-96. 
56. !d. at 72, 396-97. 
57. ld. at 375-77, 395-96. 
58. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39, reprinted in MCKECHNIE, supra note 51, at 375. 
59. MAGNA CARTA ch. 40, reprinted in MCKECHNIE, supra note 51, at 395. 
60. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 23 (5th ed. 
1956). 
61. GOLDWIN SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 136 (1955). 
62. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 340-41 (Or. 2001). See also 
COKE, supra note 53, at 45. 
63. See generally, COKE, supra note 53. 
64. THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 121. 
65. THOMPSON, supra note 51, at 355. 
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This is spoken in the person of the king, who in judgement 
of Law, in all his Courts of Justice is present, and repeating 
these words, Nulli vendemus, &c. 
And therefore, every Subject of this Realme, for injury 
done to him in bonis, terris, vel persona, by any other 
Subject, be he Ecclesiasticall, or Temporall, Free, or Bond, 
Man, or Woman, Old, or Young, or be he outlawed, 
excommunicated, or any other without exception, may take 
his remedy by the course of the Law, and have justice, and 
right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully 
without deniall, and speedily without delay.66 
As one court wrote: "Coke asserted that the common law of 
England had come to guarantee every subject a legal remedy for 
injury to goods, lands, or person caused by any other subject.,,67 
Coke's Second Institute was the primary source of understanding 
Magna Carta in eighteenth century colonial America and thus 
influenced early American constitutional thought. 68 It was not, 
however, the only source. In 1687, William Penn published The 
Excellent Priviledge of Liberty & Property Being the Birth-Right of 
the Free-Born Subjects of England. 69 Penn's comments drew from 
Coke's work,7o but he added this passage of his own, reflecting his 
great enthusiasm for Chapter 29: 
The 29th Chapter, NO FREE-MAN SHALL BE TAKEN, 
&c. Deserves to be written in Letters of Gold; and I have 
often wondred the Words thereof are not Inscribed in 
Capitals on all our Courts of Judicature, Town-Halls, and 
most pub lick Edifices; they are the Elixer of our English 
Freedoms, the Store-house of all our Liberties. 71 
66. COKE, supra note 53, at 55-56 (alteration of original). 
67. Smothers, 23 P.3d at 341. 
68. See HOWARD, supra note 51, at 121-22. 
69. WILLIAM PENN, THE EXCELLENT PRIVILEDGE OF LmERTY & PROPERTY BEING THE 
BIRTH-RIGHT OF FREE-BoRN SUBJECTS OF ENGLAND (1687), reprinted in MAGNA 
CARTA IN AMERICA 31 (David V. Stivison ed., 1993). See also THE ROAD FROM 
RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 124. 
70. Suzanne L. Abram, Problems oj Contemporaneous Construction in State 
Constitutional Interpretation, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 613, 629-30 (2000). 
71. PENN, supra note 69, at 61 (alteration of original). See also THE ROAD FROM 
RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 63 (quoting DANIEL DULANY, THE RIGHTS OF THE 
INHABITANTS OF MARYLAND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE ENGLISH LAWS 14 (1728) ("The 
29th chapter ... is not long, and ought to be read by every Body, and (in my humble 
Opinion,) taught to Children, with their first Rudiments .... ")). 
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In 1721, Henry Care published English Liberties in the colonies.72 
Care also drew from Coke on the second sentence of Chapter 29,73 
but added this: 
[F]or Justice must have three Qualities, it must be Libera, 
free; for nothing is more odious than Justice set to sale: 
Plena, full, for Justice ought not to limp, or be granted by 
piece-meal: And Celeris, speedy: Quia Dilatio est quedam 
negatio, Delay is a kind of denial: and when all these meet, 
it is both Justice and Right. 74 
Finally, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, first published in England in the 1760s,75 also influenced 
American understanding of Mag,na Carta and, therefore, American 
constitutional theory of the time. 6 Like Care and Penn, Blackstone 
quoted Coke on Chapter 29 of Magna Carta 77 and added this: 
A third subordinate right of every Englishman is that of 
applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. 
Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every 
man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all 
times be open to the subject, and the law be duly 
administered therein. 78 
For Blackstone, the "subordinate" right of access to the judiciary 
meant only that access secured other substantive fundamental rights. 
As one court summarized: 
Blackstone echoed Coke in stating that it would be "in 
vain" for the law to recognize rights, if it were not for the 
remedial part of the law that provides the methods for 
restoring those rights when they wrongfully are withheld or 
invaded. To Blackstone, the guarantee of legal remedy for 
injury "is what we mean properly, when we speak of the 
protection of the law." Hence, the maxim of English law, 
72. HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE (5th 
ed., Boston 1721). 
73. [d. at 25-26. 
74. [d. at 26 (alteration of original). 
75. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1765-1769). 
76. PLUCKNETT, supra note 60, at 287. 
77. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at 137. 
78. [d. (alteration of original). 
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Ubi jus, ibi remedium: "for every right, there must be a 
remedy.,,79 
American colonists saw themselves as Englishmen80 and therefore 
claimed to have brought the rights of Englishmen with them to the 
colonies. 81 Magna Carta and the commentaries by Coke, Penn, Care, 
and Blackstone were highly influential in their understanding of their 
rights and the development of early American constitutions. 82 Penn 
himself borrowed from Magna Carta, including Chapter 40 of the 
1215 version, in drafting the Fundamental Law of West New Jersey 
in 1676 and the Frame of Govemment of Pennsylvania in 1682.83 
Six of the original thirteen state constitutions contained provisions 
derived from Chapter 40 of the earll versions of Magna Carta or 
from Chapter 29 of the 1225 version. 8 Like other provisions in early 
declarations and bills of rights, these early open courts provisions 
were adopted to protect the new Americans from all abuses of power, 
not merely abuses by the English Crown or Parliament. 85 Today 
forty state constitutions contain some form of the open courts clause 
modeled on these early provisions and ultimately derived from 
Magna Carta. 86 
In tracing this history, courts have made clear that open courts 
provisions do not grant new rights. Instead, open courts provisions 
protect rights that existed at the time of the adoption of the state's 
open courts provision, or under the common law at the time. The 
clauses protect against legislative infringement upon those ancient 
rights, unless the legislature adopts a reasonable alternative to protect 
those rights. Thus, the Supreme Court of Connecticut wrote: 
We generally have held that [our open courts provision] 
prohibits the legislature from abolishing or significantly 
limiting common law and certain statutory rights that were 
redressable in court as of 1818, when the constitution was 
79. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 343 (Or. 2001) (citations omitted). 
80. /d. 
8!. THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE, supra note 51, at 15-16. 
82. /d. at 119-25; Smothers, 23 P.3d at 344 ("By the end of 1776, several of the 
colonies-now states-had adopted constitutions and had prefaced them with 
declarations or biBs of rights that stated 'in dogmatic fonn all of the seminal 
principles of the English constitutional system. "') (quoting C. ELLIS STEVENS, 
SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 34, 38 n.1 (1894». 
83. Koch, supra note 51, at 365-66. 
84. ld. at 367. 
85. See Smothers, 23 P.3d at 344 (citing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS 145 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980». 
86. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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first adopted, and which were incorporated in that provision 
by virtue of being established by law as rights the breach of 
which precipitates a recognized injury. . .. The legislature 
is precluded, therefore, from abolishing or substantially 
modifying any such right unless it enacts a reasonable 
alternative to the enforcement of that right. 87 
III. TWO COMPONENTS OF OPEN COURTS: THE RIGHT TO 
REMEDY, AND THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
35 
Courts have read two components in state open courts provisions: a 
"right to remedy" component, guaranteeing a remedy in law for every 
wrong or harm; and an "access to justice" component, guaranteeing 
open, free, full, and speedy access to the courts. This section looks at 
these two components in tum. 
A. The Right to Remedy 
Cases under the right-to-remedy component fall into two 
categories: those cases involving a complete abolition of a cause of 
action; and those cases involving a partial abolition, or even a 
restructuring, of a cause of action. 
In the former category, some courts look to the history of the open 
courts provision, including its roots in Magna Carta, to hold that the 
legislature may not completely abolish a cause of action that existed 
at the time of the state's adoption of its open courts provision, unless 
the legislature also created a reasonable alternative. 88 Using this 
historical approach, courts seem to privilege the state of the law at the 
time of the adoption of the open courts ~rovision over government 
interests in wholly abolishing the remedy. 9 
In contrast to the historical approach, courts in the latter category 
seem to apply a means-ends analysis-rational basis, or "middle tier" 
review-to determine whether the restriction on available remedies is 
87. Binette v. Sabo, 7\0 A.2d 688,691 (Conn. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted). 
See also Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co., 77 N.W. 174, 175 (Wis. 1898) 
("[T]he right thus obtained as a concession from sovereign power has come down to 
us through the centuries that have passed, and been preserved in all its integrity in 
substantially all state constitutions. They do not grant the right, but guaranty the 
preservation of one that existed under the constitution of England."); Smothers, 23 
P.3d at 352 ("Consistent with the foregoing observations, this court for many years 
held that the purpose of the remedy clause 'is to save from legislative abolishment 
those jural rights which had become well established prior to the enactment of our 
Constitution. "') (quoting Stewart v. Houk, 271 P. 998, 999 (Or. 1928». 
88. See Binette, 710 A.2d at 691. 
89. See id. 
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sufficiently related to the legitimate purpose of the legislature.9o 
Using this means-ends approach, courts seem to privilege the 
interests of the legislature (which is sometimes even unstated) in 
enacting the restriction on the remedy.91 
There appears to be no necessary correlation between one approach 
or the other and success for the challenger. As argued below, 
however, the historical approach probably offers stronger support to 
Civil Gideon. 
1. Complete Abolition of Right 
Courts in several states have adopted a principle that the legislature 
may not abolish common law rights that existed at the time of the 
adoption of the state's open courts provision without providing a 
reasonable alternative. 92 Courts applying this principle look to the 
state of the common law at the time of the adoption of their open 
courts provisions to determine whether the right existed. 93 For 
example, the Supreme Court of Oregon overturned the exclusive 
remedy provision in the state's workers' compensation law, because 
that provision abolished the historical common law negligence cause 
of action that was available to workers prior to the workers' 
compensation system.94 The law left injured workers without a 
remedy, unless they could show that their work was a major cause of 
their injuries. 95 
In analyzing the question, the court looked to the common law at 
the time that Oregon adopted its open courts provision. 96 It 
determined that a negligence cause of action-and, more particularly, 
a negligence cause of action by an employee against an employer for 
90. Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212, 1214 (N.H. 1999). 
91. See id. at 1214-15. 
92. See Gentile v. Altennatt, 363 A.2d 1,22 (Conn. 1975) (holding courts must provide 
alternate remedies if abolishing rights and remedies); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 
4 (Fla. 1973) (holding the legislature may not abolish a statutory or common law 
right without providing a reasonable alternative); Smothers, 23 P.3d at 362 (holding 
an Oregon statute unconstitutional because it left no remedy for one which existed at 
common law); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1983) (holding a Texas 
statute unconstitutional for abolishing a common law remedy without providing a 
reasonable alternative). 
93. See, e.g., Smothers, 23 P.3d at 360. 
94. /d. at 362. See also Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 290 N.W.2d 276, 284 (Wis. 
1980) (upholding a workers' compensation statute that operated to prevent a third-
party tortfeasor from suing the employer for contribution, because "the denial of [the 
third-party's] claim was confonnable to the law, for under the well established law of 
Wisconsin no right of contribution against the employer exists"). 
95. Smothers, 23 P.3d at 357. 
96. /d. 
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failing to maintain a safe workplace-existed at the time of the 
adoption of the open courts provision. 97 Therefore, the workers' 
compensation system's abolition of this right ran afoul of the open 
courts provision. 
At least one court recognizing this principle has ruled that it does 
not necessarily operate to establish a cause of action to protect rights 
that may have existed at common law at the time the state enacted its 
open courts provision. The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in Binette 
v. Sabo,98 declined to recognize a private right of action against state 
officers for constitutional torts under its open courts clause (although 
it did establish the right of action under other provisions in its 
constitution).99 The court reasoned: 
[T]he doctrine that, [under the open courts provision], the 
legislature may not diminish pre-I818 common-law or 
statutory rights without enacting reasonable alternatives[] 
does not necessarily imply, as the plaintiffs and amicus 
assume, that [the open courts provision], embodies a private 
cause of action for pre-I8I8 "fundamental" common-law 
rights. 100 
2. Partial Abolition of Right 
In contrast to the principle applied when the law wholly abolishes a 
cause of action that existed at the time of the adoption of the open 
courts provision, courts seem to apply some form of means-ends test 
when lerislation merely limits recovery or changes the nature of the 
claim. 10 For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld 
a damage cap that limited a tort plaintiff s recovery against a 
governmental unit to $50,000. 102 The court applied a very deferential 
rational basis test,103 not even bothering to speculate as to the 
legislative purpose. 
The same court overturned a wrongful death damage cap that 
limited the amount of damages where the death was caused by the 
injury of which the plaintiff complained, but did not limit damages 
where the death was caused by unrelated factors. 104 The court 
97. !d. at 358-59. 
98. 710 A.2d 688 (1998). 
99. [d. at 692-93. 
100. !d. at 692 (citations omitted). 
101. See infra notes 102-09. 
102. Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704, 709 (N.H. 1979). 
103. [d. at 707. 
104. Trovato v. DeVeau, 736 A.2d 1212,1217 (N.H. 1999). 
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applied "middle tier" review to determine whether the dama~e cap 
had a "fair and substantial" relation to the purpose of the cap. I The 
court was "unable to discern the legislature's intent in imposing a 
cap" and therefore ruled the cap unconstitutional. 106 
Finally, the Supreme Court of Idaho upheld a law that established 
procedures for claims that public schools and the state failed to meet 
their obligations under the "Education Article" of the Idaho 
Constitution. 107 The law limited claims to specified persons and 
required plaintiffs to exhaust certain other claims before suing the 
state. 108 The court applied a very deferential standard of review, 
focusing on the reasonableness of the scheme and on the alternative 
means to a remedy that the scheme preserved. 109 
B. Access to Justice 
Cases involving the access to justice component of open courts 
provisions seem to rely on some form of means-ends analysis. In 
those cases involving fee barriers to access, courts seem quite 
deferential to the legislature, and they seem to privilege legislative 
interests in recouping court costs and judicial efficiency. Similarly, 
in those cases involving judicial restraints on access, courts seem to 
privilege interests in judicial efficiency. 
In contrast, cases examining attorney's fee provisions as an 
impediment to access fall along a continuum. In those cases 
involving post-litigation claims for attorney's fees, courts often reject 
the open courts claim. This is hardly surprising, given that post-
litigation the parties clearly enjoyed at least some minimal access 
(i.e., they were at least present in the courtroom). In those cases 
involving pre-litigation attorney's fees, courts seem much more likely 
to fmd an open courts violation. In these cases, the courts seem to 
privilege access over any interests of the legislature or adverse 
parties. In those cases involving asymmetrical attorney's fees-
where one party, but not the other, is entitled to attorney's fees-
courts seem especially concerned with equal access. 
As argued below, it is this third category of attorney's fee cases 
that may provide the best fodder for Civil Gideon, although all the 
access cases provide at least some support. 
105. [d. at 1214. 
106. [d. at 1217. 
107. Osmunson v. State, 17 P.3d 236 (Idaho 2000). 
108. [d. at 238. 
109. [d. at 239-40. 
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1. Fee Barriers 
In cases involving fee barriers to access, courts have applied some 
form of rational basis review (or moderately heightened rational basis 
review), upheld fees and restrictions that are reasonably tailored to 
serve the efficient administration of the judiciary, and overturned 
those that are not so tailored. Courts have thus upheld fees and 
restrictions that are tailored to off-set court costs or otherwise 
promote the efficiency of the jUdiciary; 110 on the other hand, courts 
have overturned restrictions or fees that sweep more broadly than 
necessary to promote the interest in judicial economy. III 
The Illinois courts have perhaps most thoughtfully explored these 
principles in a line of cases dealing with court fees under that state's 
open courts provision. In Ali v. Danaher,112 for instance, the Illinois 
Supreme Court upheld a $1 litigation fee for the maintenance and 
operation of the county law library, even though the challengers did 
not use the library. 113 The court ruled that the library facilities were 
"available to him and his attorney and anticipating their use is not 
unreasonable." 114 Moreover, "it is clear that the presence of such 
facilities is conducive to a proper and even improved administration 
ojjustice6 which benefits every litigant." 115 In contrast, in Crocker v. Finley, II the same court struck down a $5 tax imposed on litigants in 
a marriage dissolution case to be used to fund a domestic violence 
shelter program. I 17 The court ruled that the purpose of the tax (to 
fund the shelter) was too remotely related either to the marriage 
dissolution or to an efficient judiciary. I 18 
The Illinois lower courts applied these principles in a line of cases 
that further illustrated and explained them. The court in Lee v. 
Pucinski l19 upheld photocopying fees, where the fees served only to 
off-set court costs, not for purposes unrelated to the efficient 
operation of the jUdiciary: the reproduction fees "satisfy the 
requirements of free access to justice because they are imposed only 
for purposes relating to the service provided, not for the purpose of 
110. See itifra notes 112-30. 
Ill. See id. 
112. 265 N.E.2d 103 (Ill. 1970). 
113. /d. at 107. 
114. [d. at 106. 
115. [d. (emphasis added). 
116. 459 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1984). 
117. /d. at 1351. 
118. [d. 
119. 642 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
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upheld civil filing fees and a filing surcharge for automation of the 
criminal and quasi-criminal COurtS,122 because they promoted the 
"overall administration of justice.,,123 The court in Mellon v. 
CojJelt l24 upheld a surcharge on all litigants to fund court-annexed 
mandatory arbitration in the overall interest of an efficient judiciary, 
even thoufoh the challengers did not use the court-annexed arbitration 
system. 12 The court ruled that "the existence and proper functioning 
of the [arbitration] System may benefit the overall administration of 
justice." 126 
Other courts have relied upon the interest to recoup court costs or 
to promote judicial efficiency l27 to uphold a fee for the clerk's record 
charged to a~J'ellant in a criminal case,128 a filing fee in an inmate's 
civil action,1 and a jury fee in a civil action, even where the plaintiff 
had an independent state constitutional right to a jury trial, and where 
the fee was non-refundable if the plaintiff elected to forego that 
right. 130 
120. Id. at 773. 
121. 668 N.E.2d 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
122. Id. at 192. 
123. /d. at 191. 
124. 730 N.E.2d 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
125. Id. at 108. 
126. Id. at 111. 
127. The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied upon this distinction in upholding a probate 
court fee (which the court called a "tax") against an equal protection challenge. 
Treiber v. Knoll, 398 N.W.2d 756, 761 (Wis. 1987) ("[The probate fee] seeks to 
make the probate system substantially self-sustaining and paid for by those who use 
it rather than by total funding from general tax revenues drawn from the public at 
large."). The court relied instead on the history of its open courts provision in 
upholding the fee under an open courts challenge. /d. The court thus ruled that the 
fee here was not "a species of official exactions made as the price of delaying or 
expediting justice" that the open courts provision was designed to prohibit. /d. As 
described above, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning in this case-using the 
historical purpose of its open courts provision, not the overarching concern for off-
setting court costs and efficiency within the judiciary-appears to be somewhat 
anomalous in the context of fee barrier cases. 
128. State v. Harrold, 750 P.2d 959, 965-66 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) ("The constitutional 
prohibition against 'sale' of justice is not implicated by the collection of a reasonable 
fee from a person who is able to pay."). Key to the court's decision here was that the 
appellant never claimed she was indigent or unable to pay the fee. Such a claim 
would have authorized the lower court to waive the fee under state law. /d. at 965. 
129. Longval v. Superior Court Dep't of Trial Court, 752 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 2001). 
130. Barzellone v. Presley, 126 P.3d 588,592 (Okla. 2005) ("By 1932, it was recognized 
that the right to reasonable court fees was so generally accepted that its discussion 
seemed unnecessary. Rather, the imposition of such fees was determined not to be a 
denial or sale of justice within the meaning of [the open courts provision] provided 
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2. Judicial Restrictions on Access to the Courts 
Courts have privileged this same interest in judicial efficiency 
when considering judicial restrictions on access to the courts. Thus, 
for example, the Colorado Supreme Court enjoined a litigant from 
proceeding pro se as a plaintiff in the state courts, where the litigant 
had initiated numerous meritless civil lawsuits in the state without the 
assistance of counsel. 131 The court indicated that the litigant's 
numerous suits unnecessarily burdened the taxpayers who pay for the 
costs of court administration. 132 In addition, other judges had to be 
transferred into the county to hear the litigant's suits against the 
district judge. 133 The court noted that this was "not only a waste of 
money and judicial time, but [that it] also interfere[d] with the 
dockets in the jurisdiction from which the transferred judges must 
come.,,134 The litigant's proliferation of meritless suits not only 
inhibited judicial efficiency, but also interfered with the rights of 
other litigants by crowdin~ the courts with suits stemming from the 
complaints of one person. I 5 "In a proper case, then, the right of free 
access to our courts must rield to the rights of others and the efficient 
administration of justice." 36 
But the court also ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to impose similar 
restrictions on litigation in the federal courts, because the petitioner's 
abusive suits had been limited only to the state courtS.137 This 
holding illustrates that the means-ends test in these cases is 
important: the interest in judicial efficiency may yield to the litigant's 
interest in access when the restriction attempts to proscribe behavior 
that has not interfered with an efficient judiciary. 
they were unifonn, reasonable and related to the services provided. The language of 
the constitutional provision was deemed to mean simply that justice coulU not be 
bought, nor that litigation expenses, in the nature of costs and disbursement, be so 
exorbitant and onerous as to virtually close the courthouse door.") (citations omitted). 
But see Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861, 873 (Okla. 2006) (overturning a 
statutory requirement that would-be medical malpractice claimants file an "affidavit 
of merit" prior to initiating suit, because the requirement "closes the court house 
doors to those financially incapable of obtaining" the affidavit and was not because 
of the court's interest in judicial efficiency). 
131. People v. Spencer, 524 P.2d 1084, 1086-87 (Colo. 1974). 






42 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 37 
The Nebraska Supreme Court more recently upheld litigation 
restrictions imposed by a lower court on an abusive litigant using the 
same reasoning. 138 Considering the interest in judicial efficiency 
against the claimant's open courts challenge, the court wrote: 
Our state courts and appellate system do not possess 
unlimited resources, and therefore, [the claimant's] petitions 
and appeals consume valuable time and money. Clearly, 
[the claimant's] actions restrict access to other persons who 
may have nonfrivolous cases and who do not seek to flood 
the courts with nonmeritorious actions. Thus, the district 
court was justified in limitin~ the number of pleadings 
which [the claimant] could file. 9 
Even when courts overturn judicially-imposed litigation 
restrictions, the efficient operation of the court system counter-
balances the claimant's rights under the open courts provision. 140 
But in these cases, the restrictions were not sufficiently tailored to 
serve that interest. Thus, the court in Mathena v. Haines 141 
overturned a lower court order that enjoined an inmate from filing 
any motions, letters, or communications to the lower court, unless the 
documents were signed by an attorney, because the order was not 
"designed to preserve [the inmate's] right to adequate, effective, and 
meaningful access, while protecting the court from abuse.,,142 The 
court held that litigation restrictions would survive an open courts 
challenge, if they were based on a judicial finding of the inmate's 
"clear intent[] to obstruct the administration of justice," and if they 
were "designed to preserve his ri¥ht to adequate, effective, and 
meaningful access to [the] courtS.,,14 
138. State ex rei. Tyler v. Douglas County Dist. Court, 580 N.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Neb. 
1998). 
139. [d. at 99. 
140. [d. 
141. 633 S.E.2d 771 (W. Va. 2006). 
142. [d. at 776 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (l977». 
i43. [d. at 778; see also Vest v. Vest, No. 2040332, 2006 WL 3457614, at *1, *3-4 (Ala. 
Civ. App. Dec. 1,2006) (overturning a lower court's order limiting a litigant's ability 
to seek post-judgment relief to a period of 45 days following the entry to judgment, 
because it was not tailored to achieve the court's objective "to resolve all such 
disputes expeditiously" while preserving the litigant's meaningful access to the 
courts); Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass'n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1345 (lOth Cir. 2006) 
(upholding filing restrictions on a litigant within the federal circuit where the litigant 
filed frivolous lawsuits, but overturning filing restrictions in other federal circuits, 
based on the interest in "restrict[ing] further abusive filings" by the litigant). 
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3. Attorney's Fees as a Restriction on Access 
There are three categories of cases which deal with open courts 
challenges to attorney's fees. Those cases considering challenges to 
post-litigation claims for attorney's fees seem to defer to legislative 
judgments about which liti,aants ought to be entitled to attorney's fees 
in what kinds of claims. I Those cases considering challenges to 
pre-litigation claims for attorney's fees move toward recognition that 
attorney's fees-even if opposing party's attorney's fees-represent 
a real and meaningful barrier to litigation for those who cannot 
pay. 145 Finally, those cases considering challenges to asymmetrical 
fee-shifting statutes (which authorize attorney's fees for one party in 
an action, but not to the other under similar circumstances) privilege 
an interest in equal access. 146 
a. Post-litigation claims Jar attorney's Jees 
Courts have granted great deference to legislation conferring, 
limiting, or otherwise defining the scope of attorney's fee awards 
against challenges under state open courts provisions, when the 
challenge succeeds the underlying litigation. 14 Courts have upheld 
statutes granting attorney's fees, imposing caps on attorney's fees, 
and otherwise limiting claims for attorney's feess usually under some form of rational basis review, post-judgment.14 This makes some 
sense: where a litigant has actually gained access to the courts, that 
litigant is hard-pressed to argue that he or she was denied access to 
the courts because of a post-hoc attorney fee award (one way or the 
other). In these cases, statutes providing for attorney's fees or 
appointment of counsel need only allow a litigant reasonable access 
to the courts (and not foreclose access altogether) in order to comport 
with open courts provisions. 149 In other words, courts will uphold a 
fee-shifting statute or a legislative restriction on attorney's fees as 
long as it allows some opportunity or alternative for the litigants to 
gain some access-even if not the litigant's preferred access-to the 
courts. 150 This standard is never hard to meet after the underlying 
144. See infra Part III.B.3.a. 
145. See infra Part IlLB.3.b. 
146. See infra Part III.B.3.c. 
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litigation, because then it is a truism that all parties had at least some 
access to the court. 151 
F or example, the Supreme Court of Florida in a pair of typical fee-
shifting cases, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe l52 and 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Nichols,153 upheld fee-
shifting statutes against attack under the state's open courts provision 
after the underlying litigation came to an end. 154 In Florida 
Patient's, the court equated attorney's fees with other costs of 
litigation commonly assessed against the losing party and thus upheld 
a statute granting attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a medical 
malpractice claim. 155 Similarly, the court in State Farm upheld an 
"offer of judgment" statute that granted attorney's fees to an insurer, 
where the insurer filed an offer or judgment that was not accepted' by 
the plaintiff within thirtY days in a suit for benefits under a personal 
insurance agreement. 156 In both cases, of course, the challenger had 
literal access to the courts, as evidenced by the actual litigation: in 
Florida Patient's, the challenger went to court and lost the case; 157 
and in State Farm, the challenger went to court and won. 158 In the 
former, the challenger simply had to pay the prevailing party's 
attorney's fees; 159 in the latter, the challenger received attorney's fees 
less than the parties agreed upon. 160 The Florida court thus gave 
these challenges scant analysis, deferring to the legislation in both 
cases,161 and was quite clear in its position on attorney's fees and 
open courts: "fee-shifting statutes generally do not deny access to the 
courts." 162 
Courts have similarly upheld statutory caps on attorney's fees 
against open courts challenges after the underlying litigation ceased. 
For example, the court in Lundy v. Four Seasons Ocean Grand Palm 
151. Id. 
152. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). 
153. 932 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 2006). 
154. Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1149; State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1077. 
155. Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1149; see also Capellen v. Capellen, 888 S.W.2d 
539, 546 (Tex. App. 1994) ("[T]he award of reasonable attorney's fees is no more a 
limitation on a party's right to seek redress ... than is the high cost of litigation and 
the danger of being assessed costs, attorney's fees and damages, including punitive 
damages, an unconstitutional limitation on a party's right to seek relief or to defend 
in a suit involving a common law cause of action."). 
156. 932 So. 2d at 1076. 
157. Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1145. 
158. 932 So. 2d at 1067. 
159. Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1145. 
160. State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1067. 
161. Florida Patient's, 472 So. 2d at 1148; State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1075-76. 
162. State Farm, 932 So. 2d at 1077. 
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Beach 163 upheld and enforced a statutory cap on attorney's fees that a 
successful workers' compensation claimant could receive from his 
employer, because the cap bore "a reasonable relationship to the 
state's interest in regulating fees so as to preserve the benefits 
awarded to the claimant.,,164 The court ruled that the claimant failed 
to show that the cap "abolished or unduly burdened [his] right to 
obtain benefits" 165 and that the cap therefore did not deny his access 
to the courts. 166 The court thus applied something like rational basis 
review, merely requiring that the cap bear a "reasonable relationship 
to the state's interest" and demanding that the claimant show that the 
cap wholly abolished or "unduly burdened" his access. 167 Indeed, 
these were high standards, for a claimant who had already won his 
case and underscored the claimant's burden to show something more 
than a partial denial of access to the courts in order to succeed on an 
open courts challenge to an attorney's fees statute. 168 
Other courts have upheld restrictions on attorney's fees (and even 
on representation) using a similarly deferential approach after the 
underlying litigation ended. Thus, the court in Quackenbush v. 
Superior Court l69 upheld a voter proposition that limited non-
economic damages resulting from certain automobile accidents. 170 
Plaintiffs claimed that the proposition impaired their access to the 
courts, because attorney's contingency fees normally came from non-
. 171 
economic damages, not compensatory damages. The court 
rejected that argument, ruling that affected plaintiffs will be able to 
obtain counsel and thus achieve access by arrangements other than 
• C b d . d 172 contmgent lee agreements ase on non-economIc amages. 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of Colorado in Hartley v. 
Hartle/ 73 upheld a statute allowing a court to appoint counsel to a 
dependent child in a custody dispute, but rejected the child's claim 
that Colorado's open courts provision entitled him to counsel of his 
choice after the court awarded custody to his father. 174 The court 
163. 932 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 




168. ld. at 509-10. 
169. 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271 (Ct. App. 1997). 
170. ld. at 273. 
171. ld. at 279. 
172. ld. 
173. 886 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1994). 
174. ld. at 675. 
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ruled that the open courts provision did not create a substantive right; 
instead, it "guarantee [ d] access to the courts when an individual ha[ d] 
a viable claim for relief." 175 Because the child claimed a substantive 
right-the right to counsel of his choice-the open courts provision 
h · h I 176 gave 1m no e p. 
Thus any access, even if not the claimant's preferred access, 
satisfies the open courts provision. l77 And when considered after the 
underlying litigation, it is hardly surprising that courts find that 
claimants actually had some access (of course they did)-and uphold 
a fees statute against open courts challenges. 
One case deserves special mention because of the strong 
underlying interest at stake. Doe v. State l78 involved a class-action 
challenge to Connecticut's restrictions on p~ents for abortions for 
patients receiving state medical assistance. I Although the class of 
indigent women prevailed on the merits, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut denied their claim for attorney's fees under the state's 
open courts provision. 180 The court ruled that it was the plaintiffs' 
indigency, not their successful constitutional challenge against the 
state funding restriction, that gave rise to their claim for attorney's 
fees. 181 But the court had "never recognized a rule that indigency 
alone require [ d] the state to waive the fees and costs, and bear the 
entire financial burden of litigation itself." 182 Moreover, "it [was] 
clear that, in this instance, [the Connecticut courts] were 'open,' and 
that the plaintiffs had 'access' to them.,,183 Of course the class did: 
they retained counsel, put on their case, and won. 
Thus, even when the underlying claim rises to constitutional 
dimensions, courts seem to honor the trend that costly, inconvenient, 
or disagreeable access is nevertheless constitutionally sufficient 
access under open courts provisions. Only those fee statutes that 
175. !d. 
176. !d. at 675-76. 
177. ld. 
178. 579 A.2d 37 (Conn. 1990). 
179. ld. at 38-39. 
180. ld. at 45. 
181. ld. ("Rather, it is the plaintiffs' indigency which becomes the keystone of their 
argument. . .. Their current claim is that, as prevailing indigents, they are entitled to 
attorneys' fees, not that the constitutional violation from which they suffered a 
cognizable injury has not been redressed."). 
182. ld. at 44. 
183. ld.; see also Kiddie v. Kiddie, 563 P.2d 139, 142 (Okla. 1977) (ruling that a husband 
had no right to appointed counsel in a divorce proceeding and that his lack of funds 
to employ counsel "technically [did] not deny [him] access to the courts"). 
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result in some greater denial of access-an absolute denial of 
access-will violate open courts provisions. 184 
b. Pre-litigation attorney's fees 
When attorney's fees serve to bar access absolutely, courts have 
found a violation of the open courts provision with little analysis. 
For example, the courts in Communiw, Hospital of the Palm Beaches, 
Inc. v. Guerrero l85 and In re Flores 86 both found a violation of the 
open courts provisions when litigants were ordered to pay the 
opposing party's attorney's fees up front, prior to the litigation. In 
Community Hospital, the court overturned a provision that required 
healthcare professionals, when contesting discipline or lost 
privileges, to post security in the amount of opposing parties' 
potential attorney's fees prior to initiating suit. 187 In Flores, the court 
ruled that any court order to strike a trial, on the basis that the 
opposing party failed to pay interim attorney's fees, was 
unconstitutional. 188 In each case, attorney's fees provisions cut off 
access before the underlying trial began. In both instances, the courts 
did not hesitate to find an open courts violation. 
c. Asymmetrical attorney's fees 
In certain civil actions, courts have been more concerned with 
equality of access to the judiciary when considering fee-shifting 
statutes that permit attorney's fees for one party but not the other. 
ThIs type of fee-shifting statute is often designed to equalize access 
between parties in cases where one party is at some sort of an 
inherent disadvantage, or to encourage litigants to bring certain 
socially desirable claims that they might not otherwise bring for fear 
of incurring insurmountable litigation costs. Courts in these cases 
often subject these statutes to a higher level of scrutiny because they 
treat parties differently for attorney's fee purposes and consider the 
statutes' role in equalizing access between otherwise unequal 
litigants, thus taking seriously the imperative of equal access to 
justice. The courts consider the relative abilities of the parties to 
secure access in the underlying litigation, the purpose of the fee-
shifting provision in equalizing access between the parties, and the 
184. See infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. 
185. 579 So. 2d 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
186. 135 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. App. 2004). 
187. 579 So. 2d at 305 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (citing Guerrero v. Humana, Inc., 548 So. 
2d 1187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989». 
188. Flores, 135 S.W.3d at 865. 
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nature of the underlying case. These factors often trump any 
concerns about disparate treatment between the parties on the face of 
an asymmetrical fee-shifting statute. 
An Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum 
CO.,189 provides an excellent example of these principles. In Thayer, 
the court upheld a fee-shifting statute that authorized attorney's fees 
for a prevailing plaintiff, but not for the defendant when he removed 
a case from small claims court to district court. 190 The court 
reaffirmed that "equal access to the courts, and modes of procedure 
therein, constitute basic and fundamental rights,,,191 and that "[w]here 
fundamental rights and liberties are involved, classifications which 
might restrain them must be strictly scrutinized." 192 
Notwithstanding its strict scrutiny analysis, the court nevertheless 
upheld the asymmetrical fee-shifting provision based on broader 
considerations of equal access to justice. 193 The court's reasoning is 
worth quoting at length: 
The obvious intent of the statute imposing attorney fees on 
the defendant if the plaintiff prevails is to preserve the 
viability and accessibility of the small claims court. The 
exegesis behind the small claims court is to open the courts 
to the citizenry. . .. The small claims court provides redress 
for the ordinary person. 
The plaintiff who attempts to recover a nominal sum in 
district court is likely to be intimidated by the judicial 
process, and the employment of counsel becomes a 
necessity rather than an option. The litigants are treated 
equally so long as the case remains within the ambit of the 
small claims court. It is only when the defendant elects to 
transfer the case that attorney fees are impressed on the 
defendant, should he lose. 
. . . The statute is obviously imposed as an incentive to 
prompt settlement of small but well-founded claims, to 
foster the legislative policy of summary, informal 
189. 613 P.2d 1041 (Okla. 1980). 
190. Jd.atI045. 
191. Jd. at 1044. 
192. Jd. at 1045. 
193. !d. 
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disposition of small claims, and as a deterrent to groundless 
defenses. 194 
49 
Thus the court's two broader concerns-equalizing access between 
otherwise unequal litigants (by providing the one, but not the other, 
with counsel), and affecting the purposes of the small claims court (to 
"open the courts to the citizenry")-justified the asymmetrical fee-
shifting fgf0vision, despite its facially disparate treatment of the 
litigants. 95 
Similarly, in Alford v. Garzone l96 the court upheld a fee-~hifting 
statute that authorized attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs securing 
protective orders under Oklahoma's Protection from Domestic Abuse 
Act, but not to defendants who were successful in avoiding protective 
orders. 197 The court ruled that ready access to courts is a 
fundamental right irrespective of the underlying claim, thus 
triggering strict scrutiny. 198 But when the court applied strict 
scrutiny to the fee-shifting provision, it nevertheless upheld it in the 
broader interest of equalizing access between parties in very different 
situations and encouraging victims of domestic violence to bring 
claims. 199 The court reasoned: "[the fee-shifting statute] is rationally 
based and concerns a compelling state interest. It encourages victims 
to pursue their legal remedies in court without the threat of attorney 
fees being awarded should an order not be entered.,,2oo 
Other courts have upheld asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes using 
similar reasoning. The court in Westfield Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities 
194. ld. at 1043 (footnote omitted). 
195. The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed the spirit of this ruling in Professional 
Credit Collections, Inc. v. Smith, 933 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1997). In that case, the court 
overturned a lower court's denial of attorney's fees to a dismissed defendant in a 
collection action by a creditor. ld. at 309. The lower court denied fees based on a 
statute that authorized fees only for "prevailing" parties. Ed. at 309, 310 n.l. The 
court ruled that the defendant was a prevailing party for the purpose of the fee-
shifting statute, and that the open courts provision demanded that the dismissed 
defendant qualifY for attorney's fees where the plaintiff creditor, if successful, would 
have qualified for attorney's fees under the fee-shifting statute. ld. at 311. 
196. 964 P.2d 944 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998). 
197. Ed. at 948. 
198. ld. at 947 (citing Thayer v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 613 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Okla. 
1980)). In Thayer, the court found "that equal access to the courts ... constitute[ s] 
basic and fundamental rights" and that "[w]here fundamental rights and liberties are 
involved, classifications which might restrain them must be strictly scrutinized." 613 
P.2d at 1044-45. 
199. Alford, 964 P.2d at 948. 
200. Ed. 
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Servo Oil CO. 201 upheld, under rational basis review, a provision that 
authorized attornez6"s fees for a franchisee, but not a franchisor, in a 
franchise dispute. 02 The court ruled that the statute was a legitimate 
attempt to equalize access between parties with unequal resources, 
stating, "The Legislature may well have detennined that the 
comparable economic positions of the parties were such that free 
access to the courts for the franchisee could only be £Uaranteed if 
counsel fees could be awarded to successful plaintiffs.,,2 
The Vennont Supreme Court in Fleury v. Kessel/Duff Construction 
CO. 204 upheld a statute authorizing attorney's fees to a prevailing 
empl0ifsee, but not a prevailing employer, in a workers' compensation 
case.2 5 The court's analysis was admittedly sparse, but it was 
clearly based on its concern for ensuring equal access as between 
litigants with unequal resources. It stated, "Indeed, we have come to 
recognize as a society that a denial of the right to recover attorney's 
fees, or alternatively, publicly subsidized counsel, will prevent many 
individuals including workers' compensation claimants from having 
. . ,,20() 
access to Justice. 
And finally, the court in Bay/ront Medical Center, Inc. v. Li07 
upheld, under rational basis review, a statute that required 
unsuccessful, non-indigent plaintiffs-but not unsuccessful, indigent 
plaintiffs-to pay the attorney's fees of the prevailing defendant. 208 
The court reasoned that "[t]he legislature has the power to exempt 
indigent litigants from the ambit of the statute. Such an exemption 
does not affect a solvent litigant's right of access to the court1 but 
rather, protects an indigent party's right of access to the courts." 09 
Thus in considering asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes, courts seem 
to privilege the broader interest of equal access as between litigants 
who are otherwise unequal (because of resources, or because of their 
relative role in the claim) over the facial disparate treatment under the 
statute, whatever level of scrutiny the courts apply. In other words, 
courts' overriding consideration in these cases is equal access to 
justice for all parties, not just the party claiming that an asymmetrical 
fee-shifting statute impedes its access to the courts. And courts 
201. 392 A.2d 243 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 1978). 
202. Id. at 247. 
203. Id. at 248. 
204. 543 A.2d 703 (Vt. 1988). 
205. Id. at 703, 705. 
206. Id. 
207. 465 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
208. Id. at 1384. 
209. Id. at 1384 (emphasis added). 
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therefore interpret the open courts provision to ensure that 
asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes provide equal access to all, 
notwithstanding the fact that these statutes by their nature yield a 
facially disparate result. 
IV. OPEN COURTS AND CIVIL GIDEON 
Based on this analysis of selected open courts cases, the open 
courts case for Civil Gideon may be best made by combining an 
historical argument (drawing on those cases analyzing a complete 
abolition of a right of action, discussed supra)210 with an equal access 
argument (drawing on the attorney's fees cases, discussed supra).2l1 
An argument based on judicial efficiency (based on the fee-access 
and judicial restraint cases, discussed supra)212 may offer some 
additional support, but the low-tier means-ends test (in those cases 
considering a partial restraint on a cause of action, and in some other 
cases) offers nothing positive toward Civil Gideon. 
This section provides some thoughts on each of these arguments, 
save the last, in their likely order of usefulness in establishing Civil 
Gideon. Because the historical argument, the equal access argument, 
and the judicial efficiency argument are rooted in very different 
approaches to open courts provisions, their combination offers 
perhaps the most comprehensive approach under open courts to 
achieve Civil Gideon. 
A. The Historical Argument 
As described more fully above, the historical analysis looks to 
rights of action that existed at the time of the adoption of the open 
courts provision to determine whether a statutory restraint violates 
the open courts provision. If the rights existed at the time of 
adoption, a complete denial, without a meaningful alternative, is 
likel y to be overturned. 2 \3 
Civil Gideon existed in the statutory and common law as early as 
1494, well before any state enacted an open courts provision. 214 The 
210. See supra Part lILA. 
211. See supra Part III.B.I. 
212. See supra Part III.B.2. 
213. Attorneys for appellant Deborah Frase (including Stephen H. Sachs and Debra 
Gardner, both of whom participated in this Symposium) presented substantially this 
same argument to the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 
100,840 A.2d 114 (2003). See Brief of Appellant at 32-36, Frase, 379 Md. 100,840 
A.2d 114 (No.6). 
214. ld. at 32-36; see infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. 
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English Parliament, in order to "carry the poor man through the ins 
and outs of an action at common law,,,215 enacted 11 Hen. VII, ch. 
12, which read in part: 
[T]he Justices [] shall assigne to the same pou psone or 
psones Councell lerned by their discrecions which shall 
geve their Councelles nothing taking for the same, and in 
like wise the same Justices shall appoynte attorney and 
attorneies for the same pou psone and psones and all other 
officers requisite and necessarie to be hadde for the spede of 
the seid sutes to be hadde and made which shall doo their 
duties without any rewardes for their Counce lIes help and 
besynes in the same .... 216 
The English courts extended this right to counsel to civil defendants 
as a matter of common law in 1668 in Wait v. Farthing. 217 Thus, the 
right to court-appointed counsel for indigent civil plaintiffs and 
defendants had deep historical roots by the time the first states 
adopted open courts provisions. According to an historical analysis, 
state open courts provisions adopted when English statutory and 
common law reco~nized a right to appointed counsel also sought to 
protect this right. 2 
215. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REv. 361, 373 
(1923). 
216. II HEN. 7, ch. 12 (1495), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 (1816), 
microformed on Microcard No. 55E53 (Matthew Bender & Co.). See also Maguire, 
supra note 215, at 373-74 (quoting the Henry VII statute and commenting that "[i]f 
the rules of law be complicated, [the poor] are to have the aid of lawyers 
gratuitously"). This statute remained on the books until 1883. A rule sometime prior 
to 1744, however, probably somewhat circumscribed the practical application of this 
right to counsel. This rule required that a person seeking in forma pauperis status 
(and thus appointed counsel) should "have a Counsel's Hand to his Petition." /d. at 
377 (quoting LILLY'S REG., ed. 1745,851, tit. Forma Pauperis). Maguire notes that 
the "rule itself is one of the best imaginable illustrations to a vicious circle. An 
applicant comes to court for gratuitous legal service because he cannot beg or pay for 
a lawyer's services; he finds that he must beg or pay for a lawyer's certificate before 
the court will hear him; and so his suit ends without ever beginning." Id. When the 
statute was revoked in 1883, new court rules "liberalized the practice in important 
respects," but left the requirement "of an opinion from counsel and affidavit from a 
solicitor" to "get these vital documents." Id. at 380. 
217. 84 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1668). 
218. This argument may receive additional support under those state constitutions that 
contain an incorporation clause explicitly providing the benefits of English statutes 
on a particular date to the citizens of the state. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, supra 
note 213, at 32-33. Maryland's incorporation clause reads as follows: 
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common 
Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of 
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It is not clear that courts would apply an historical analysis to a 
claim for Civil Gideon, however. Courts seem to have applied an 
historical analysis in those cases involving a statutory deprivation of 
a cause of action, not an assertion of particular affirmative procedural 
or substantive rights. 219 But there appears to be no good reason not 
to apply an historical analysis to a claim for Civil Gideon. At least, 
the historical evidence would buttress arguments based on equal 
access and judicial efficiency. 
B. The Equal Access Argument 
This argument is based upon the privileged interest in equal access 
to the courts under the attorney's fees cases. These cases are 
particularly relevant to Civil Gideon, because attorney's fees and fee-
shifting statutes are closely related to the right to counsel. 
Attorney's fees and fee-shifting statutes provide free or reduced-
cost legal representation to the party to whom the court grants 
attorney's fees, usually the winning party.220 From the winning 
party's financial perspective, this fee-shifting is the functional 
equivalent to receiving appointed counsel221 (The only difference is 
that the opposing party, not the court, pays the costs of 
representation. But this makes no difference to the winning party).222 
Fee-shifting provisions thus yield the same result as a court 
appointing counsel; but the triggering characteristic for many fee-
shifting provisions is not poverty or indigence, but rather victory in 
that Law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as 
existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-
six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their 
local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and 
practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity . . . subject, 
nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the 
Legislature of this State. 
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. V. 
219. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra Part III.B.3.a. See, e.g., 42 V.S.c. § 1988(b) (2006) ("[T]he court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs."); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 49-262(D) (1956) ("The court ... may award costs of 
litigation, including reasonable attorney ... fees, to any substantially prevailing party 
.... "); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 6-213(C) (LEXISNEXIS 1999) ("[T]he 
prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable 
attorney's fees."). 
221. See supra note 13 (noting that appointed counsel is at the public's expense and thus 
free to indigent persons). 
222. See supra Part III.B.3.a. (citing cases that state the opposing party pays the cost of 
litigation); see supra note 220. 
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the underlying suit. 223 Some fee-shifting statutes are designed to 
encourage meritorious or socially desirable claims. 224 These statutes 
authorize the award of attorney's fees to a victorious plaintiff in order 
to encoura~e (or, rather, not to discourage) certain socially desirable 
litigation. 2 But these do not change the underlying similarity 
between fee-shifting statutes and court orders appointing counsel: the 
successful party in either situation receives free legal counsel. Fee-
shifting statutes thus have much in common with courts appointing 
counsel, especially from the vantage point of the litigant who 
receives attorney's fees or court-appointed counsel. 
Judicial deference to the legislature in the line of cases ruling on 
awards of attorney's fees after the underlying litigation, discussed 
more fully above, teach only that the courts respect the legislature's 
judgment as to which cases and which litigants deserve a given level 
of representation paid for by the opposing party. For Civil Gideon 
purposes, these cases suggest that the courts would uphold a statute 
awarding attorney's fees to a victorious indigent civil litigant, but 
they certainly do not suggest that open courts (or any other 
constitutional provision) would compel attorney's fees or 
appointment of counsel. 
The line of cases involving attorney's fees imposed prior to 
litigation gets us a step closer to Civil Gideon. Courts in these cases 
seem to recognize that attorney's fees pose a real barrier to the courts 
for those who cannot afford them. To be sure, these cases involve 
requirements to pay the other party's attorney's fees up front. 
Nevertheless, courts in these cases have not hesitated to overturn the 
requirement under an open courts challenge. The principle behind 
these cases seems to be that attorney's fees-anyone's attorney's 
fees--create a meaningful barrier to access. So too with indigent 
civil litigants haled into court against their will or with indigent civil 
litigants pressing a claim in order to protect their rights: their full 
access to the jUdiciary-i.e., access with representation by counsel-
is meaningfully impeded by their inability to pay their own attorney's 
fees. 226 
223. See supra Part III.B.3.a. 
224. Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 190 (1984) (discussing the policy behind fee-shifting 
statutes). 
225. ld. 
226. This is especially true in those cases involving basic human needs-not because the 
personal interest is high, but because indigent litigants may have a harder time 
fmding counsel to represent them on a contingent-fee basis. 
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Combining these cases with the cases involving asymmetrical 
attorney's fees provisions, we come yet closer to Civil Gideon. As 
described more fully above, those cases add an interest in equality to 
the interest in access, sometimes even heightening the level of 
scrutiny. But under any level of scrutiny, courts in this line privilege 
the interest in equality as between the litigants, especially otherwise 
unequal litigants, so that each may obtain counsel. Thus, as 
described more fully above, courts have upheld asymmetrical fee-
shifting provisions against open courts challenges based on the 
broader interest of promoting equality in litigation as between parties 
with unequal access to counsel. In other words, any access barriers in 
asymmetrical fee-shifting statutes will yield to broader interests in 
equality in litigation. The narrow holding in these cases is that 
legislative efforts to equalize parties' access by authorizing attorney's 
fees to one party, but not the other, withstand an open courts 
challenge. But the principle behind these holdings is that meaningful 
access to the courts requires counsel when the opposing party has 
access to counsel. This principle, even if not the strict, narrow 
holdings in these fee-shifting cases, puts us at the doorstep of Civil 
Gideon. 
C. The Judicial Efficiency Argument 
This argument builds on the interest behind those cases involving 
fee barriers and judicial restraints on access to the courts. 227 As 
described more fully above, courts in these cases seem to privilege 
the interests in recouping costs of litigation and in overall judicial 
efficiency. 228 The claim for Civil Gideon appeals strongly to the 
latter. 
Unrepresented litigants can often impede judicial efficiency in their 
own cases and in the courts in general, because court personnel need 
to expend additional time and resources to ensure that they receive as 
fair an access as possible. The judges and clerks must take time to 
help unrepresented litigants through a process that is often entirely 
foreign to them: helping them to prepare court filings, to understand 
court rules and other rules of procedure, and even to present their 
case, all within the bounds of maintaining a neutral judiciary. 
Depending on the case and the litigant, this can result in significant 
time and effort on the part of court personnel, drawing judicial 
resources away from other cases and impeding speed and efficiency 
227. See supra Part III.B.I-2. 
228. See supra Part m.B.I. 
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in the unrepresented litigant's own case. Professor Engler writes that 
other players within the court system in an attempt to foster change 
have· developed creative practices to help those without 
counsel achieve justice; these individuals are more in need 
of the backing of court administrators, additional resources, 
or even philosophical justifications to support their work. 
Moreover, the process is dynamic, not static, as conferences, 
trainings and reports have caused a detectable shift in 
attitudes. Behavior [assisting unrepresented litigants] that 
was impermissible a decade ago is becoming more 
acceptable today . 
. . . Unrepresented litigants are perceived to be a problem 
because they take up court and attorney time. 229 
Moreover, litigation with an unrepresented party may result in 
additional errors that an attorney could easily have avoided. 
Correcting these errors-especially if the correction requires an 
appeal-draws on judicial resources that could be used in other cases. 
Frase v. Barnhart,230 the 2003 Maryland Civil Gideon case, 
provides an excellent example of misallocated judicial resources to 
correct gross errors at trial that an attorney almost certainly would 
have prevented. In that case, Ms. Frase involuntarily appeared pro se 
to defend against a private petition for custody of her children. 23 1 
The list of her litigation mistakes at a hearing before a special master 
is (understandably) long; it includes some fundamental errors that 
any litigating attorney (or even upper-level law student) would have 
avoided. 232 The special master "addressed Ms. Frase reprovingly" 
and cut her off in her questioning,233 behavior that skewed the fact-
finding at the hearing and that an attorney certainly would have 
challenged. In addition, the special master had been retained by Ms. 
Frase's mother-an adverse witness in the case-ten years earlier in 
her own custody case against Ms. Frase, resulting in a likely violation 
of a rule of judicial ethics. 234 A competent attorney certainly would 
have discovered this earlier in the case and moved to remove the 
master from the case. Finally, in a blatantly procedurally flawed 
229. Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social 
Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 697, 705-06 (2006) (citations omitted). 
230. 379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003). 
23 L Brief of Appellant, supra note 213, at 29. 
232. Id. at 29-32. 
233. Id. at 7. 
234. Id. at 14-19; see also Frase, 379 Md. at 126,840 A.2d at 129 (reversing the circuit 
court's ruling and holding the issue was moot, thereby not addressing it). 
20071 Civil Right to Counsel 57 
ruling,235 the circuit court entered untenable conditions on its award 
of custody to Ms. Frase that were also substantively flawed on their 
face. 236 
In order to correct these problems-many of which a competent 
attorney would have avoided in the first place-Ms. Frase's case 
went all the way to Maryland's highest court, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland. 237 The court, in a lengthy and divisive opinion reflecting 
the significant and unnecessary judicial resources expended in this 
case, reversed the lower court's ruling and remanded without 
addressing Ms. Frase's claimed right to counsel. 238 Unfortunately, 
Ms. Frase's case is not even the worst example of the many cases 
involving misuse of judicial resources to correct problems that an 
attorney would easily have avoided.239 
Thus, the cases dealing with fees and judicial restraints on 
litigation, i.e., the cases that take seriously the interest in judicial 
efficiency, lend support to Civil Gideon, because court-appointed 
counsel for otherwise unrepresented individuals often enhances 
judicial efficiency (or, stated differently, avoids gross inefficiencies). 
The larger challenge to any of these three arguments-and the 
challenge that litigants must be prepared to face-is that courts rarely 
use open courts provisions to recognize or grant affirmative rights, 
like the right to counsel. Rather, courts use open courts provisions 
overwhelmingly to protect a negative right-the right against 
interference by the state to the courts. As anyone who has 
represented low-income individuals knows, this is a false dichotomy; 
an indigent individual's poverty is every bit as much a barrier to the 
235. Frase, 379 Md. at 120, 840 A.2d at 125-26 ("[W]e note our disagreement with the 
procedure employed by the court, of purporting to decide the custody case, on 
exceptions from the master's report and recommendations, and yet setting conditions 
inconsistent with the custody awarded and subjecting Ms. Frase to periodic review 
hearings. The very thing that makes the order immediately appealable also erodes its 
validity."). 
236. Id. at 125, 840 A.2d at 129 ("Having found Ms. Frase to be a fit parent in her existing 
circumstances and having found no exceptional circumstances that would make her 
custody of Brett detrimental to his best interest, the court had no more authority to 
direct where she and the child must live than it had to direct where the child must go 
to school or what religious training, if any, he should have, or what time he must go 
to bed."). 
237. !d. at 100,840 A.2d at 114. 
238. !d. at 128-29, 840 A.2d at 131. 
239. !d. at 134, 840 A.2d at 134 ("The facts in the present custody related case are not 
even as egregious as many we see. In many cases a poor, sometimes undereducated 
and unsophisticated, parent is faced with the full might of the State, an entity that 
itself seeks to deprive the parent of his or her children.") (Cathell, J., concurring). 
58 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 37 
courts as a statutory or judicial restriction on access. Now we need to 
persuade the courts of this truth. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The jurisprudential disarray among state courts in interpreting their 
open courts provisions makes any generalization about open courts 
difficult. But despite often inconsistent and incoherent rulings among 
the states, certain larger patterns seem to emerge from these cases and 
lend support to Civil Gideon. 
This article attempted to draw on some of those patterns to begin to 
develop a more comprehensive open courts argument for Civil 
Gideon. I hope that Civil Gideon instigators can build upon and 
apply some of these patterns in the context of the open courts 
jurisprudence of their own state courts and thus move in the direction 
of Civil Gideon. 
